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Abstract 
 
 Better educated countries have better governments, an empirical regularity that holds in 
both dictatorships and democracies. A possible reason for this fact is that educated people are 
more likely to complain about misconduct by government officials and that more frequent 
complaints encourage better behavior from officials. Newly assembled individual-level survey 
data from the World Justice Project show that, within countries, better educated people are more 
likely to report official misconduct.  The results are confirmed using other survey data on 
reporting crime and corruption. Citizen complaints might thus be an operative mechanism that 
explains the link between education and the quality of government.   
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I. Introduction 
 
 By just about any measure, the quality of government is higher in richer and more 
educated countries.  Such countries tend to be more democratic, politically freer, more respectful 
of property rights, less corrupt, and more efficient in the provision of public services such as 
infrastructure and regulation (see, e.g., La Porta et al. 1999, Barro 1999, Treisman 2000, 
Svensson 2005). Figure 1 illustrates some well-known correlations between education and the 
quality of government. The positive correlation between education (or per capita income) and the 
quality of government holds in both dictatorships and democracies (Figure 2).  It also holds in 
countries with different legal traditions, ethnic heterogeneity, and inequality (La Porta et al. 
1999). Most studies find that education and development lead to improved government (e.g., 
Barro 1999, Glaeser et al. 2004, Bobba and Coviello 2007, Castello-Climent 2008, Murtin and 
Wacziarg 2011), although some disagree (Acemoglu et al. 2005). In this paper, we ask why the 
quality of government improves with education and development, assuming that it does.   
 The most common explanation of the improvement in the quality of government in the 
process of development is accountability.  Perhaps the central mechanism of such accountability, 
going back at least to Hirschman’s (1970) idea of voice, is voting. If voters punish incompetent 
or corrupt politicians, and if education promotes political participation and voting, then increases 
in education lead to improvements in the quality of government. Verba and Nie (1972) and 
Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) are among the first prominent studies in political science 
linking education to political participation. These studies consider both voting and other forms of 
participation, such as volunteering. Dee (2004) and Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopoulus (2004) 
provide evidence of causal links between education and voting.    
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Voting is surely important, but the fact that the quality of government improves with 
education in dictatorships as well as in democracies is an indication that voting is not the only 
mechanism linking the two. In fact, recent research has broadened the notions of political 
accountability, and focused on the roles of audits, the media, disclosure by politicians, political 
checks-and-balances, and even uprisings, in monitoring government misconduct. Some of the 
growing number of studies in this area include Reinikka and Svensson (2004, 2005), Glaeser, 
Ponzetto, and Shleifer (2007), Olken (2007), Pandey et al. (2007), Ferraz and Finan (2008, 
2011), Djankov et al. (2010), Pande (2011), and Ferraz, Finan and Moreira (2012).    
In this paper, we propose a complementary mechanism of accountability.  In our view, 
one reason why government improves is that citizens complain against public officials who 
mistreat them: policemen who beat them up, officials who demand bribes, teachers who do not 
show up.  All countries have some laws against police abuse, corruption, and public employee 
absenteeism, which include penalties for official misconduct. A public official choosing to break 
rules must trade off the risk of being disciplined, no matter how small for each individual 
complaint, against the benefits of misconduct.  As citizen complaints proliferate, the risk of an 
investigation and disciplinary action rises. We propose that educated people are more likely to 
complain against official misconduct (and perhaps to complain more effectively).  As education 
levels in a country rise, so do complaints when officials misbehave, raising the expected costs of 
misconduct and thus encouraging better behavior – to ask for fewer bribes, to avoid abusing 
people, to show up to work. Through this entirely decentralized process, only roughly dependent 
on the prevailing political arrangements such as democracy or dictatorship, the quality of 
government improves. In our working paper (Botero et al. 2012), we present a simple model 
illustrating this mechanism.  
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We present evidence bearing on three hypotheses derived from this view of complaints 
and accountability: (1) educated people complain more, (2) citizens complain more in countries 
with a higher probability of action being taken against a misbehaving official, and (3) better 
educated countries have a lower incidence of public misconduct.  Our main data source is a 
series of surveys of the general population carried out by the World Justice Project in 97 
countries between 2009 and 2012 (Agrast et al. 2012).  These surveys cover the experiences and 
perceptions of people in their dealings with the government, the police, the courts, as well as 
with crime and victimization. The data also contain information about the demographic 
characteristics of the respondents, including their education.  
The principal questions from the WJP surveys we examine deal with official misconduct 
and whether it was reported by the victim.  There are two main questions in the surveys; the first 
asks whether respondents have complained about some aspect of government services in general 
during the previous year. The second question asks whether respondents experienced police 
abuse, and if so, whether they reported it. In addition, the WJP surveys contain information about 
respondents reporting crime, specifically break-ins and armed robberies.
2
 Although these 
questions do not pertain to complaints about public misconduct per se, they do give us 
information about the propensity to report problems to the government, and thus shed light on 
the relationship between education and voice. Finally, WJP asks respondents to assess whether 
policemen who violate the law will be punished, and we use these data as a proxy for the 
expected likelihood of the success of a complaint.    
  To further check the robustness of our results, we supplement WJP data with some 
questions from the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS), which contains information 
                                                 
2
 The relationship between education and crime-reporting has been studied by Soares (2004a, b) and DiTella et al. 
(2010) in a different context. 
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about households’ experiences with crime, including reporting to the police, for thousands of 
respondents in 78 countries.  The ICVS contains a number of questions concerning the reporting 
of crime, which enables us to assess the robustness of our WJP findings on reporting using 
different data.  In addition, for a few questions, the ICVS asks the respondents the reasons for 
reporting or not reporting the incidents of crime and corruption. We also use the Corruption 
Barometer from Transparency International to examine the incidence of corruption in a number 
of countries, whether it is reported, as well as the reasons for reporting or not reporting.    
Our main findings can be easily summarized.  First, we find empirical support for the 
proposition that, within countries, the more educated people complain more, both about 
government misconduct when it occurs and crime in general.  This relationship is particularly 
strong in developing countries, consistent with the view that, in developed countries, even the 
less educated have the knowledge and lack of fear to complain. Second, the country-average 
assessment that a policeman violating the law will be punished is a strong predictor of the 
probability of complaining about misconduct and reporting crime. Third, the results are 
particularly strong in autocracies, suggesting that voting might not be the only important exercise 
of voice in the political process. Fourth, the analysis of additional data sets confirms our main 
findings. Fifth, educated countries have a lower incidence of public and private misconduct.  
Overall, the evidence is consistent with the view that complaints influence accountability. 
In our regressions, education may proxy for something else, such as income, trust, social 
status, or even gender.  For example, richer people might be able to hire lawyers, or even to find 
time, to make their complaints more effective (on the other hand, their time is more valuable, so 
they might not bother). Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) show empirically, however, that 
education is more important than income as a determinant of political participation. One can 
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likewise argue that trust in institutions is correlated with education, and that trust rather than 
education drives complaints.  It could also be that socio-economic status or gender drives the 
confidence in the success of a complaint, and hence the likelihood that it is made.  
We examine all these alternatives empirically. The evidence shows that few of these 
factors influence the likelihood of complaining, and none eliminate the large impact of education 
on complaints. While it is still possible that education is correlated with a relevant omitted 
individual-specific variable, such as personal drive or ambition, there is some reason to believe 
that education is indeed an important determinant in individuals’ decisions to report government 
misconduct.  Our analysis is of course based on cross-sectional data and as such does not prove 
causation.  It nonetheless identifies an interesting relationship that deserves further exploration.  
 The empirical analysis raises a number of questions of interpretation.  First, why are the 
more educated more likely to complain?  There are at least three possibilities.  First, educated 
people might merely know better how to complain effectively: they are more literate, more 
articulate, and more knowledgeable about where to go and how to complain.  This is a pure 
human capital channel: complaining is like any other activity for which productivity rises with 
education.  Verba and Nie (1972), Verba, Scholzman, and Berry (1995), and Nie, Junn, and 
Stehlik-Berry (1996) take this point of view with respect to political participation.  A second 
channel is that educated people are more pro-social, share common values, and are less tolerant 
of injustice (Dewey 1944, Hayek 1960, Putnam 1993, Campbell 2006, Glaeser, Ponzetto, and 
Shleifer 2007, Algan et al. 2013).  Because better educated people are better socialized, they are 
more willing to complain against public misconduct even when the odds of private success are 
low.  A third channel, intimately related to the first, sees educated people as less fearful of 
official reprisals.  This might be in part because they know the law and the rules, and hence can 
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stand up to officials, but it might also be because they are themselves “legal” –  work formally, 
occupy their residence formally – and hence do not feel at risk. We explore some of these 
possibilities empirically, and find that fear of police reprisals and the lack of knowledge of how 
to complain seem to be important factors behind silence.   
 In the next section, we describe our data. Section III presents the basic findings from the 
WJP database. Section IV examines other data sources. Section V concludes.  Our findings are 
broadly consistent with the hypothesis that, via the complaint mechanism, education promotes 
government accountability and ultimately the quality of institutions.   
   
II. Data 
The arguments outlined above yield three main hypotheses: (1) educated people are more 
likely to complain, within a country; (2) a higher expected probability of success in a country 
encourages complaints; and (3) more educated countries have a lower incidence of public 
misconduct, in equilibrium.  We bring these hypotheses to the data using individual-level data on 
citizen complaints and reporting from the general population polls of the World Justice Project 
(Agrast et al. 2012). Over the last three years, the WJP has conducted extensive surveys in 97 
countries of the perceptions and experiences of ordinary people concerning their dealings with 
the government, the police, and the courts; the extent of corruption; as well as the magnitude of 
common crimes to which the general public is exposed. These surveys were carried out in three 
waves in 2009, 2011, and 2012 on probability samples of 1,000 respondents drawn from the 
three largest cities in each country, and were conducted by professional polling organizations 
using face-to-face, telephone, and online interviews. All survey questions we use deal with 
personal experiences of individuals or their families. Our final sample contains data for 88 
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countries. These are the countries for which information on the level of education status of 
respondents was available (Appendix A presents the list of countries covered by the WJP that 
have information available on the level of education of respondents).
3
  
Our basic measures of citizen complaints against public officials come from two 
questions. The first question, available only in the 2011 and 2012 waves of data collection, is 
worded as follows: “During the last year, did you submit any complaint about the services 
provided by the different government agencies in your country (including registration office; 
customs office; public health services; tax office; land allocation office, etc.)?” The second 
question asks whether respondents experienced police abuse, and if so whether they reported it. 
The question reads “In the last 3 years, have you or someone in your household, been subjected 
to physical abuse by the police or the military?” and is followed by the question “Did you or 
anyone else report the crime to the police or other authority?” 
The WJP polls also ask respondents whether they were victim of crime during the last 
three years and whether they reported it to the police. We use two of these questions. The first 
question is: “In the past 3 years, did anyone actually break into your home/residence without 
permission, and steal or try to steal something?” and “Did you or anyone else report the crime to 
the police?” The second question asks: “In the past 3 years, were you a victim of an armed 
robbery (with a weapon such as a knife or a gun)?” and “Did you or anyone else report the 
crime to the police?”  This last question was only asked in the 2011 and 2012 waves of data 
collection.   
                                                 
3
 The distribution of countries in the sample is: 14 from Sub-Saharan Africa; 6 from Middle East and North Africa; 
5 from South Asia; 19 from East/Central Europe and Central Asia; 13 from East Asia and Pacific; 15 from Latin 
America and Caribbean; and 16 from Western Europe and North America. 
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The WJP data also contain demographic information, particularly on education, but also 
on income, trust, gender, and asset ownership, which can be converted into indicators of socio-
economic status. We construct two indicators of education level: College and High/Middle 
school. The first indicator equals 1 if the respondent answered “Bachelor's degree” or “Graduate 
degree (Masters, Ph.D.)” to the question “What is the highest degree you received?” The second 
indicator is coded 1 if the respondent answered “Middle school diploma” or “High school 
diploma or equivalent”. 
A key determinant of complaining about government misconduct is the estimated 
probability of success.  Using WJP data, we construct a country-level proxy for this probability, 
based on a qualitative assessment of the following question: “In [country], if members of the 
police violate the law, they are punished for these violations.”  Because, unlike our data on 
complaints and reporting, this question does not deal with a personal experience, we use country 
averages.  
We supplement the WJP data with information from the International Crime Victims 
Survey (ICVS) and the 2009 TI Global Corruption Barometer.  The ICVS is an international poll 
designed to provide comparable data on people’s recent experience with common crime around 
the world.  By 2005, over 140 surveys had been completed in 75 different countries, totaling 
over 320,000 individual respondents.  We construct a sample using the most recent data for each 
country and focus on two groups of questions. The first group asks respondents whether they 
have experienced burglary, attempted burglary, robbery, fraud, and personal theft; and whether 
the crime was reported to the police. The second group asks whether respondents have been 
solicited for bribes in the previous year, whether they reported the incident, as well as the reasons 
for reporting or not reporting it. The ICVS includes demographic characteristics, but questions 
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regarding respondents’ level of education are not consistently asked throughout the different 
waves of data collection. Accordingly, we define college by the highest degree attained, the 
years of schooling (more than 15), or if the respondent completed school when he/she was older 
than 21 years. Similarly, we define High/Middle school as having finished Middle or High 
school, having between 9 and 15 years of schooling, or as having completed school when the 
respondent was between 15 and 21 years old. 
The TI Global Corruption Barometer is a worldwide public opinion survey on the general 
public’s views and experiences of corruption. Each country sample is probabilistic and is 
weighted to provide a representative sample of the national population.  We use three questions 
from the 2009 wave, which covers 69 countries: “Over the past 12 months, have you or anyone 
living in your household paid a bribe in any form?” and the follow-up questions “Did you 
present a formal complaint in this regard?” and “Why you did not present the complaint?”  
Table 1 presents the definitions of the variables from the WJP and the supplementary 
sources used in the analysis and Appendix B displays the summary statistics for our main 
variables. As the Appendix B shows, there is a fair amount of variation in the level of education 
and the probability of complaining among countries. For instance, the fraction of college 
graduates in the three largest cities covered in our data ranges from 4% in Sri Lanka to 71% in 
Russia, while the proportion of people who submitted a complaint against a government agency 
goes from 2% in Georgia to 38% in Ethiopia. 
 
III. Evidence 
Basic Findings 
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To begin, we focus on the relationship between education and the reporting of 
government misconduct or crime at the individual level. Our basic specification includes two 
indicator variables for whether the respondent is a college graduate or a high school graduate, 
respectively, and country fixed-effects to control for potential country-specific omitted variables. 
The dependent variables are dummies equal to zero or one depending on whether a particular 
event occurred. Unless otherwise noted, all the results are estimated using OLS with country 
fixed effects, and standard errors clustered at the country level so as to account for dependence 
among observations within each country.  This specification allows us to examine most simply 
the extent to which respondents' reporting behavior is related to their education, other observable 
characteristics, as well as their country’s institutional environment.   
Table 2 contains results for 7 questions from the WJP database.  Four of these questions 
were administered in 88 countries, for a total of about 87,000 observations.
4
  The remaining 
questions were asked in only 63 countries. The first three questions deal with reporting 
government misconduct; the last four questions deal with reporting crime.  For each individual in 
the survey, we have data on whether he or she is a college graduate, a high school graduate, or 
has less than high school education.   
The first question asks whether the respondent submitted a complaint about services 
provided by any government agency during the past year.  Compared to individuals with less 
than a high school degree, college graduates are 5.1 percentage points more likely to have 
submitted a complaint (t = 5.19), while high school graduates are 2.8 percentage points more 
likely to have submitted a complaint (t = 3.08). These are large effects compared to the 
                                                 
4
 The questions on police abuse victimization and burglary victimization contain 86,528 and 86,678 observations, 
respectively. The follow-up questions were asked only of respondents who said they had been victimized for a total 
of 5,005 and 11,663 observations, respectively  
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worldwide complaining mean of 15.6 percent.  The second question asks whether the respondent 
or someone in their household has been unfairly subjected to physical abuse by the police or the 
military during the last three years.  College and high school graduates are less likely to say that 
they have been abused, but these effects are not statistically significant.  The next question asks 
the 5,005 individuals in the WJP survey who say they have been abused whether they had 
reported this police abuse.  Here we find a sharply higher and statistically significant probability 
of reporting (compared to the 47 percentage point world mean) among college and high school 
graduates.  Compared to respondents with less than high school education, college graduates are 
8.0 percentage points more likely to report abuse, and high school graduates are 3.1 percentage 
points more likely, although this estimate is not statistically significant. The data on reporting 
government misconduct from the WJP suggest that education is associated with a sharply higher 
probability of complaining. 
The remaining four questions in Table 2 deal with reporting crime.  The more educated 
are more likely to experience break-ins and armed robberies than the less educated, and are much 
more likely to report the crime. Relative to the world-wide mean of 61 percent of reporting 
break-ins, college graduates were 10.2 percentage points more likely to report the crime, and 
high school graduates 5.2 percentage points were more likely to report the crime than those 
without a high school degree.  Relative to the world-wide mean of 60 percent of reporting armed 
robberies, college graduates were 8.8 percentage points more likely to report the crime, but high 
school graduates were no more likely to report than those without a high school degree.  The 
effect of education, particularly college education, on reporting crime is huge. In order to check 
the robustness of our findings, we revisit our analysis using logistic regressions and obtain 
almost identical results (available in Appendix C). Taken together, the results in Table 2 are 
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supportive of the central assumption of our theory, namely that education encourages complaints 
about misconduct.   
We investigate next whether a higher expected probability of success in a country 
encourages people to complain. In Table 3, we replace country fixed effects with two country-
level controls (log of GNI per capita and rule of law) and with country-average assessments of 
the probability that a policeman violating the law will be punished.  The last variable ranges 
from 0 to 1. We have these data for only 56 countries. The data show large effects of the 
estimated probability of punishment on the likelihood of complaining, with parameter estimates 
ranging from 0.38 for complaints about government services to 0.9 for reporting police abuse.  
These high coefficients might be partially explained by the omission of country fixed effects, so 
the probability picks up other aspects of the quality of government.  For two out of four measures 
of complaining (about government services and reporting burglary), our measures of education 
remain statistically significant and of comparable magnitude to their Table 2 values. The 
assumption that the expectation of success when reporting misconduct encourages individuals to 
complain also finds support in the WJP data. In the remainder of the empirical analysis, we 
return to the country fixed effect specifications to make sure we do not contaminate our findings 
on individual behavior with country-wide factors.  
 
Variation across Countries 
An interesting empirical question is whether the results in Table 2 vary by the level of 
education in a country.  For instance, the benefits of college education may be relatively small in 
educated countries, where people are generally more empowered and know how to act against 
government misconduct. Table 4 looks at this issue by going back to a country fixed effect 
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specification, but including interactions between individual respondent’s level of education and 
the country-average level of education (or more formally, between the respondent’s level of 
education and an indicator variable for whether the expected number of years of schooling in the 
country is greater than 14 years). The results show that the relationship between education and 
complaining holds in uneducated countries, but not in educated countries.  In countries with 
lower levels of educational attainment, college and high-school graduates are much more likely 
to complain and to report police abuse and crime than those without a high school degree. For 
example, a person with a college education is 6.3 percentage points more likely (compared to a 
mean of 15.6) to complain about government services, and 10.2 percentage points more likely 
(compared to a mean of 46.8) to report police abuse, than a person without a high school degree. 
In contrast, all coefficients of the interaction terms are negative and most are statistically 
significant, indicating that these findings do not hold for more educated countries. Joint 
hypothesis tests indicate that, in these countries, there is no effect of education on complaints 
about government services, reporting of police misconduct, or reporting of assault, although 
there is a positive and statistically significant effect of college education on reporting burglary 
incidents. These results are robust to using different specifications (Appendix D) as well as 
different measures of educational attainment (not reported). The evidence suggests that 
uneducated people in uneducated countries might indeed not know how to complain, or be 
fearful of the authorities (see the evidence described below).  In educated countries, in contrast, 
the knowledge of how to address government misconduct is more widespread, and there is less 
fear of reprisal. As a consequence, the relationship between education and complaints is not 
nearly as clear cut in educated countries.   
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One of the key motivating facts for our paper is that the quality of government improves 
with education in both democracies and autocracies.  Accordingly, we expect our mechanism to 
work in both. In Table 5 we present the results including interactions between education 
variables and autocracy scores. The coefficients on interactions are generally insignificant, 
indicating that our results hold consistently in both autocracies and democracies for complaining 
about government services, reporting police abuse, as well as reporting crime. These results are 
robust to changes in the cut-off points used to define autocracy (Appendix D) and to using a 
continuous rather than a dummy variable (not reported). The fact that the results hold strongly in 
autocracies is important. Taken together with the relationships in Figure 2, this suggests that it 
might be not only the voting mechanism stressed by Hirschman and Verba, but also the 
decentralized process of individuals complaining against government misconduct, that serves to 
discipline government officials and improve accountability as countries develop.  
 
Is Education a Proxy for Something Else? 
An important question about our finding is whether education is a proxy for something 
else that may encourage complaining.  The leading possibilities are 1) trust or social capital, 2) 
income, 3) social status, and 4) gender.  More trusting people may be better educated but also 
have greater confidence that their complaints will be addressed fairly.  Richer people may be 
better educated but also have greater resources to complain and perhaps greater sums to 
complain about.  Individuals of higher socio-economic status may be better educated but also 
feel more empowered to complain.  Men may be better educated and also more aggressive or 
optimistic about success if they complain.  Fortunately, the WJP data contain some information 
on each of these matters, so the concerns can be addressed empirically.   
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Several of the respondent-level questions asked in the WJP survey concern the level of 
trust in institutions, and we aggregate them into a trust index. We also have for each individual a 
measure of trust in others. Although the WJP data do not contain information about the exact 
income of the respondents, it has information on the quintile of the income distribution into 
which the respondent falls.
5
  The WJP data set also contains a series of questions related to social 
status, including 22 questions on whether the respondent has a certain asset, service, or utility 
service (for example a car, a cell phone, a credit card, etc.) and a self-assessment of his socio-
 economic status.  These questions, however, are only available in the 2011 and 2012 waves of 
data.  Finally, the WJP data contain information about the gender of the respondent.  
We have run a large number of specifications checking whether the inclusion of these 
additional controls changes our results on education. Table 6 presents the results of our base 
specification with trust in public institutions, gender, and four indicator variables for whether the 
income of the respondent is in the second, third, fourth, or highest quintile of the country's 
income distribution all included in the regression.
6
  The results in Table 6 do not offer much 
evidence that trust, income, or social status matter for complaining, while education coefficients 
remain both sizable and statistically significant (except for reporting police abuse).  These results 
hold across a range of specifications, including some with a full set of indicator variables for the 
income group of respondents interacted with the country fixed effect (Appendix E).  Education is 
not merely a proxy for trust, income, or social status in these data.   
There is some evidence that men are more likely than women to complain about 
government services, but not to report police abuse, burglary, or assault (although they are more 
                                                 
5
 For a few countries, income is not broken out by quintiles, but by quartiles (2 countries) or deciles (4 countries).  In 
those cases, we have adjusted the categories to match up with the rest of the countries.  
6
 This regression includes 55 countries, as three of the wealth variables are not available for 8 countries. We have 
replicated the analysis excluding these variables and obtain results similar to those reported in Table 6.   
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likely to report having been victims). We have also checked the effect of including self-
assessments of the socio-economic status of respondents – alone and interacted with the country 
fixed effects – in place of their income group (Appendix F and G).7  The effects of education 
remain large and significant.  We obtain similar results when we use indicator variables for 
whether respondents have a certain asset or utility service (Appendix H) or when we use 
individuals’ levels of trust in others instead of trust in public institutions (Appendix I). Finally, 
we have checked whether religion influences the probability of complaining, and found no 
evidence that it does. 
Another concern is that the propensity to complain is shaped by access to the complaint 
technology, such as a cell phone or a computer, rather than by education per se.  As reported in 
Appendix H indeed, having a cell phone sharply raises the probability of reporting police abuse 
and burglary, though not of complaining about government generally.  At the same time, having 
a cell phone does not have much of an effect on education coefficients (There is also no evidence 
of complementarities between education and cell phone ownership.)  We do not find that having 
a computer affects the probability of complaining or reporting a crime.  The evidence suggests 
that cell phones do indeed facilitate police abuse reporting and crime reporting, but education is 
by no means a proxy for having a cell phone. 
One final concern to mention is the possibility of a survey response bias because 
uneducated people might worry about survey administrators being connected with police, and 
therefore might  not admit that they reported police abuse.  However, this concern applies only to 
police, and not to general complaining about government services.  The fact that we have 
                                                 
7
 Self-assessment of the socio-economic status is coded between 1 and 10 and is the answer to the question "Imagine 
a staircase with 10 steps, in which on the first step are located the poorest and on the 10th step, the richest.  Where 
would you put yourself on this staircase?" 
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consistent results across types of complaints undermines this concern.  Moreover, the WJP has a 
97% response rate to these questions, suggesting that respondents are not afraid.  We cannot 
fully discount this concern, but we doubt that it fully explains our fairly consistent results.     
The bottom line of the robustness section is that education does not seem to be a proxy 
for income, trust, socio-economic status, gender, or access to reporting technology.  Education 
matters a great deal more than other determinants of complaints, and their inclusion in the 
regression does not substantially influence the impact of the education variables.  
 
IV. Other Data Sources   
We next examine the robustness of our results in other data sources, and probe the 
reasons for reporting or not reporting government misconduct and crime.  In Table 7, we use the 
ICVS data on crime, which contain information on crime victimization, bribing, and reporting to 
the police, and have been used by several authors including Soares (2004a, b), Van Dijk (2007) 
and Mocan (2008). We focus on the latest available survey for each country.  Table 7 reports, for 
a sample of 125,000 observations from 71 countries, that the incidence of reporting burglary, 
attempted burglary, robbery, consumer fraud, and theft was sharply higher for better educated 
individuals.  Across specifications, the results confirm the findings in the WJP data.  
Table 8 focuses on ICVS data on corruption, and the reasons for reporting and not 
reporting requests for bribes. The first column shows, not surprisingly, that better educated 
people are more likely to be asked for a bribe.  The next two columns show that educated people 
are not more likely to report the request for a bribe to the police, but are more likely to report it 
to a public or private agency.  In explaining the reasons for not reporting, educated people are 
less likely to report that the matter was inappropriate for police, but are also less likely to worry 
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that the police will not do anything or to fear/dislike police.  There is evidence here that the less 
educated are more concerned with police reprisals and hence fail to use their voice.   In the 
second panel of Table 8, we examine affirmative reasons in ICVS for reporting corruption, but 
do not find any interesting and statistically significant effects.    
Table 9 deals with the data from the TI Global Corruption Barometer 2009 produced by 
Transparency International. The sample is over 60,000 people from 62 countries. As with ICVS, 
educated people report much higher probabilities of being asked for a bribe: 4.3 percentage 
points higher for a college graduate than for a person with no high school education (compared 
to a mean of 17.7 percent).  There is also strong evidence of college graduates being more likely 
to file a formal complaint for being asked to pay a bribe: with a world-wide average probability 
of a complaint of 19.8 percent, college graduates are 2.4 percentage points more likely to file a 
complaint. With respect to reasons for not reporting corruption requests, the evidence here is 
again considerably stronger than with ICVS. College graduates were 6.1 percentage points less 
likely to report that they did not know how to file a complaint as the reason for not doing so than 
individuals without a high school education (the mean of this variable is 16 percent).  They are 
also more likely to report that it would not have helped.  Last, they are 3.2 percentage points less 
likely to report a fear of reprisals (the mean of this variable is 21.8 percent).  The evidence points 
to a combination of the pure human capital story whereby the more educated know how to 
complain, and a related story that these people do not fear the police.   The Corruption Barometer 
evidence is broadly consistent with our basic theory.       
Yiqing Xu (2012) re-examines our hypotheses using the data set of complaints against 
provincial and local government officials in China, using the China Public Governance Survey.  
He also finds that in the Chinese data, better educated citizens are more likely to complain about 
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both government misconduct and public services. Xu finds even larger effects of education than 
we do. He also finds that the reasons for higher complaints by the better educated include greater 
knowledge, greater civicness, and lower fear of reprisals. Xu’s evidence strongly reinforces our 
hypothesis that the complaint mechanism of institutional improvement is of particular 
importance in non-democratic countries.     
 As a final step, we check whether higher education countries have lower rates of 
victimization of citizens by criminals and government officials. Figure 3 summarizes these 
findings, and confirms this basic aggregate prediction of the theory, namely that higher education 
countries have lower crime and better government performance. This particular prediction, of 
course is not new: it is the within-country mechanism that represents this paper’s innovation. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 We have proposed a new explanation of the universal positive association between a 
country’s educational level and the quality of its government, namely citizen complaints. We 
argued that educated citizens complain more, and that these complaints lead to better conduct by 
officials fearful of being punished, which in turn leads to greater accountability and a higher 
quality government. One attractive feature of this mechanism is that it is entirely decentralized, 
and does not rely on any particular institution, such as democracy.   
The evidence from a newly collected data for 88 countries from the World Justice 
Project, and from two additional sources, shows that within countries better educated citizens are 
indeed more likely to complain about both crime and government misconduct, such as corruption 
and police abuse.  We showed that the association between complaining and education is robust 
to the inclusion of other individual characteristics such as trust, socio-economic status, or gender.  
21 
 
We also showed that country-average assessment of the probability that an official violating the 
law will be punished also influences the likelihood of complaints. Although our cross-sectional 
evidence cannot establish causality, it points tentatively to human capital operating through 
complaints as an operative mechanism of accountability and institutional improvement. 
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Figure 1: The quality of government and education (TI Corruption Index, WB Governance 
Indicators, Economic Freedom Index, and WJP Rule of Law Index) 
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Figure 2: The quality of government and education in autocratic and democratic regimes 
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Figure 3: Incidence of mistreatment, bribing, and crime and education (WJP, Barometer 
and ICVS data sets) 
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Table 1: Description of the variables 
 
Variable Description 
1. Cross-country variables 
Education  The expected number of years of schooling, or school life expectancy (SLE). It is defined as the total number of years of schooling which a child can 
expect to receive, assuming that the probability of his or her being enrolled in school at any particular future age is equal to the current enrolment ratio at 
that age. It is a synthetic summary indicator of the overall pattern of enrolment ratios at one particular point in time, and has no predictive value except in 
so far as it is believed that enrolment patterns will remain unchanged into the future. Source: http://unstats.un.org 
 
Transparency 
International 
Corruption 
Perceptions Index  
The score of the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index in 2010. The index provides a measure of the extent to which corruption is 
perceived to exist in the public and political sectors. The index focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public 
office for private gain. The index ranges between 0 (highly corrupt) and 10 (highly clean). Source: www.transparency.org. 
 
World Bank 
Governance 
Indicators  
The averaged score of the Worldwide Governance Indicators 2010 (WGI). The WGI 2010 reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for 213 
economies for six dimensions of governance: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ 
Heritage Economic 
Freedom Index  
The score of the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom in 2011. The index measures ten components of economic freedom, assigning a grade 
in each using a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the maximum freedom. The ten components of economic freedom are: Business Freedom, Trade 
Freedom, Fiscal Freedom, Government Spending, Monetary Freedom, Investment Freedom, Financial Freedom, Property rights, Freedom from 
Corruption, and Labor Freedom. Source: www.heritage.org. 
 
WJP Rule of Law 
Index 
The WJP Rule of Law Index is the average of the eight factors of the Rule of Law Index measured in 2011: Limited Government Powers, Corruption, 
Order and Security, Fundamental Rights, Open Government, Effective Regulatory enforcement, Access to Civil Justice, Effective Criminal Justice. Scores 
range between 0 and 1, with 1 representing a higher adherence to the rule of law. Source: http://www.worldjusticeproject.org 
 
Democracy An indicator variable coded 1 if the polity2 score from the 2011 Polity IV data set is below 0. The polity2 score is computed by subtracting a county's 
autocracy score from its democracy score. The resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). 
Source: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4 
 
Autocracy An indicator variable coded 1 if the polity2 score from the 2011 Polity IV data set is equal or larger than 0. The polity2 score is computed by subtracting a 
county's autocracy score from its democracy score. The resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). 
Source: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4 
 
Educated An indicator variable coded 1 if the expected number of years of schooling, or school life expectancy (SLE) in the country is greater than 14 years Source: 
http://unstats.un.org 
Log GNI per capita Log GNI per capita is the natural logarithm of the GNI per capita (formerly GNP per capita) for the year 2011. The GNI per capita is the gross national 
income, converted to U.S. dollars using the World Bank Atlas method, divided by the midyear population. Source: http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators 
 
Punishment for police 
misconduct (country 
average) 
Country average of a categorical variable coded 1, 0.66, 0.33 or 0 if the respondent answered respectively “ALWAYS”, “OFTEN”, “RARELY” or 
“NEVER”  to the question “ In [COUNTRY], if members of the police violate the law, they are punished for these violations”. Source: World Justice 
Project database 
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Variable Description 
2. Within-country variables(World Justice Project database) 
College (WJP) Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered “Bachelor's degree” or “Graduate degree (Masters, Ph.D.)” to the question “What is the highest 
degree you received?” Source: World Justice Project database 
 
High/Middle school 
(WJP) 
Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered “Middle school diploma” or “High school diploma or equivalent” to the question “What is the 
highest degree you received?” Source: World Justice Project database 
 
Complained about 
government services 
Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “During the last year, did you submit any complaint about the services 
provided by the different government agencies in your country (including registration office; customs office; public health services; tax office; land 
allocation office, etc.)?” Source: World Justice Project database 
 
Police abuse Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “In the last 3 years, have you or someone in your household, been subjected to 
physical abuse by the police or the military?” Source: World Justice Project database 
Report police abuse Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “(For those who have been victimized) Was the crime reported to the police or 
other authority?” Source: World Justice Project database 
 
Burglary (WJP) Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “In the past 3 YEARS, did anyone actually BREAK into your home/residence 
without permission, and steal or try to steal something?” Source: World Justice Project database 
 
Report burglary 
(WJP) 
Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “(For those who answered Yes to Burglary) Did you or anyone else report the 
crime to the police?” Source: World Justice Project database 
 
Assault  Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “In the past 3 YEARS, were you a victim of an ARMED ROBBERY (with a 
weapon such as a knife or a gun)?” Source: World Justice Project database 
 
Report Assault  Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “(For those who answered Yes to Assault) Did you or anyone else report the 
crime to the police?” Source: World Justice Project database 
 
Trust Index Index between 0 and 1, where 1 indicates more trust. The index is the average of four questions: How much TRUST do you have in each of the following 
categories of people, groups of people, and institutions? (1)  Officers working in the local government; (2) Officers working in the national government; 
(3) The police; (4) The courts (On a 4-point scale from 0 (No trust) to 1 (A lot of trust)). Source: World Justice Project database 
 
Trust in others The variable is the categorical response to the following question: How much TRUST do you have in each of the following categories of people, groups 
of people, and institutions? People living in this country (On a 4-point scale from 0 (No trust) to 1 (A lot of trust)). Source: World Justice Project database 
 
Wealth: Asset Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent/household has the asset, service, or utility service described in the question. Source: World Justice Project 
database 
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Variable Description 
3. Within-country variables(ICVS) 
College (ICVS) Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent answered: (1) “High/university” to the question “How would you define your level of education?” (43 
countries in our sample); or (2) if the respondent reported more than 15 years of formal education (24 countries in our sample); or (3) if the respondent 
had completed school when he/she was older than 21 years (8 countries in our sample). Source: ICVS 
 
High/Middle school 
(ICVS) 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent answered: (1) “Secondary” or “College” to the question “How would you define your level of education?” 
(43 countries in our sample); or (2) if the respondent reported between 9 and 15 years of formal education (24 countries in our sample); or (3) if the 
respondent had completed school when he/she was between 15 and 21 years old (8 countries in our sample). Source: ICVS 
 
Burglary (ICVS) Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “Over the past five years, did anyone actually get into your home/residence 
without permission, and steal or try to steal something? I am not including here thefts from garages, sheds or lock-ups.” (C06A000) Source: ICVS 
Report burglary 
(ICVS) 
Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “Did you or anyone else report the last burglary/housebreaking to the police?” 
(C06B400) Source: ICVS 
Attempt  Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “Apart from this, over the past five years, do you have any evidence that 
someone tried to get into your home/residence unsuccessfully. For example, damage to locks, doors or windows or scratches around the lock?” 
(C07A000) Source: ICVS 
Report Attempt Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “(The last time this happened) did you or anyone else report the attempted 
burglary/housebreaking to the police?” (C07B400) Source: ICVS 
Robbery  Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “Over the past five years has anyone stolen something from you by using force 
or threatening you, or did anybody try to steal something from you by using force or threatening force.” (C09A000) Source ICVS 
Report Robbery  Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “(The last time this happened) did you or anyone else report the robbery to the 
police?” (C09B400) Source: ICVS 
Fraud  Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “Last year, in 2004 were you the victim of a consumer fraud. In other words, 
has someone --when selling something to you or delivering a service-- cheated you in terms of quantity or quality of the goods or services?” (C13A100) 
Source: ICVS 
Report Fraud  Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “(The last time this happened) did you or anyone else report the robbery to the 
police?” (C13B400) Source: ICVS 
Theft Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “Apart from theft involving force there are many other types of theft of 
personal property, such as pick-pocketing or theft of a purse, wallet, clothing, jewelry, sports equipment, This can happen at one's work, at school, in a 
pub, on public transport, on the beach, or in the street. Over the past five years have you personally been the victim of any of these thefts?” (C10A000) 
Source: ICVS 
 
Report Theft Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “(The last time this happened) did you or anyone else report the robbery to the 
police?” (C10B400) Source: ICVS 
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Variable Description 
 
Corruption (ICVS) 
 
Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “During 2004, has any government official, for instance a customs officer, a 
police officer or inspector in your country asked you, or expected you to pay a bribe for his or her services?” (C14A100) Source: ICVS 
 
Report Corruption 
Police (ICVS) 
Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “(The last time) did you or anyone else report this problem of corruption to the 
police?” (C14B400) Source: ICVS 
 
Report Corruption 
Other (ICVS) 
Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “(The last time) did you or anyone else report it to any public or private 
agency?” (C14B600) Source: ICVS 
 
Reasons for not 
reporting (ICVS) 
Indicator variables coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the options of the question “If not, why didn't you report it?” (A) not serious enough; (B) 
solved it myself; (C) inappropriate for police; (D) other authorities; (E) my family solved it; (F) no insurance; (G) police could do nothing; (H) police 
won’t do anything; (I) fear/dislike of police; (J) did no dare; (K) other reasons (C14B411 to C14B421) Source: ICVS 
 
Reasons for reporting 
(ICVS) 
Indicator variables coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the options of the question “If yes, why did you report it?” (A) recover property; (B) 
insurance reasons; (C) should be reported; (D) want offender caught; (E) to stop it; (F) to get help; (G) compensation; (H) other reasons (C14B401 to 
C14B408) Source: ICVS 
 
4. Within-country variables(Corruption Barometer) 
College (Barometer) Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered “High level education (e.g. university)” to the question “What is the highest education attained?” 
(educ) Source: TI Corruption Barometer 2009 
 
High/Middle school 
(Barometer) 
Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered “Secondary school” to the question “What is the highest education attained?” (educ) Source: TI 
Corruption Barometer 2009 
 
Corruption 
(Barometer) 
Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “On the past 12 months, have you or anyone living in your household paid a 
bribe in any form?” (ti5) Source: TI Corruption Barometer 2009 
 
Report Corruption 
(Barometer) 
Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “If in the past 12 months you or any member of your household were asked to 
pay a bribe to obtain a service or to resolve a problem, did you present a formal complaint in this regard?” (ti6a) Source: TI Corruption Barometer 2009 
 
Reasons for not 
reporting (Barometer) 
Indicator variables coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the options of the question “Why you did not present the complaint?” (A) Did not know 
how to do it; (B) It would have taken too much time; (C) It would not have helped at all; (D) Tried but couldn’t; (E) Fear of reprisals; (F) Other reasons (t 
ti6bm1- ti6bm6) Source: TI Corruption Barometer 2009  
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Table 2: Complaints and education 
 
This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions of the dependent variable from the WJP data set (shown in the first row) on indicator variables for the 
education status of the respondents. All regressions include fixed effects for countries. Clustered standard errors are shown in brackets. 
 
Complained 
about 
government 
services 
Police abuse 
Report police 
abuse 
Burglary 
(WJP) 
Report 
burglary 
(WJP) 
Assault  Report Assault  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
College 0.051*** -0.006 0.080** 0.027*** 0.102*** 0.023*** 0.088*** 
[0.010] [0.004] [0.031] [0.006] [0.018] [0.008] [0.022] 
High/Middle school  0.028*** -0.007* 0.031 0.010* 0.052*** 0.016** 0.01 
[0.009] [0.004] [0.028] [0.005] [0.014] [0.006] [0.017] 
        Observations 60,634 86,528 5,005 86,678 11,663 61,812 4,090 
R-squared 0.108 0.074 0.142 0.057 0.176 0.102 0.159 
Number of countries 63 88 88 88 88 63 63 
Mean. Dep. Variable 0.156 0.0603 0.468 0.136 0.611 0.0665 0.599 
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
                
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Complaints and education with controls for the probability of punishing misconduct 
 
This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions of the dependent variable from the WJP data set (shown in the first row) on indicator variables for the 
education status of the respondents, a country-score of the perceived likelihood of punishment for members of the police who violate the law and two country-
level controls (log of GNI per capita and rule of law). The perceived likelihood index ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 represents a higher likelihood of punishment. 
Clustered standard errors are shown in brackets. 
 
Complained 
about 
government 
services 
Police abuse 
Report police 
abuse 
Burglary 
(WJP) 
Report 
burglary 
(WJP) 
Assault  
Report 
Assault  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
College 0.081*** -0.009 0.121** 0.010 0.181*** -0.005 0.112*** 
[0.021] [0.012] [0.046] [0.015] [0.031] [0.013] [0.032] 
High/Middle school  0.036* -0.016 0.065 -0.010 0.114*** -0.007 0.021 
[0.019] [0.010] [0.048] [0.014] [0.030] [0.011] [0.026] 
Punishment for police 
misconduct (cty avg) 
0.385* 0.176 0.907*** 0.102 0.654* 0.043 0.555** 
[0.225] [0.111] [0.285] [0.134] [0.340] [0.158] [0.232] 
 
-0.011 -0.017 -0.059*** -0.031*** -0.019 0.004 -0.076*** 
Log GNI per capita [0.019] [0.010] [0.019] [0.010] [0.026] [0.012] [0.017] 
 
-0.076 -0.009 0.321 0.173* 0.371 -0.229* 0.829*** 
WJP Rule of Law Index [0.109] [0.056] [0.264] [0.101] [0.278] [0.125] [0.231] 
 
0.053 0.128** 0.246* 0.261*** 0.107 0.145** 0.463*** 
Constant [0.090] [0.051] [0.133] [0.056] [0.143] [0.060] [0.127] 
 
0.081*** -0.009 0.121** 0.010 0.181*** -0.005 0.112*** 
        Observations 53,738 54,763 2,974 54,847 7,792 54,823 3,787 
R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.044 0.010 0.042 0.008 0.071 
Number of countries 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 
Mean. Dep. Variable 0.160 0.055 0.476 0.143 0.597 0.069 0.582 
Fixed effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
                
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Complaints, education, and the educational attainment in the country 
 
This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions of the dependent variable from the WJP data set (shown in the first row) on indicator variables for the 
education status of the respondents and their interactions with an indicator variable coded 1 if the educational attainment in the country is greater than 14 years. 
All regressions include fixed effects for countries. Clustered standard errors are shown in brackets. 
 
Complained 
about 
government 
services 
Police abuse 
Report police 
abuse 
Burglary 
(WJP) 
Report 
burglary 
(WJP) 
Assault  Report Assault  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
       
College  0.063*** 0.004 0.102*** 0.036*** 0.118*** 0.033*** 0.100*** 
[0.012] [0.005] [0.037] [0.008] [0.022] [0.009] [0.027] 
High/Middle school 0.040*** -0.001 0.064** 0.015** 0.052*** 0.020*** 0.01 
[0.010] [0.004] [0.030] [0.006] [0.015] [0.006] [0.020] 
College X Educated -0.046* -0.034*** -0.128* -0.034** -0.047 -0.031 -0.038 
[0.024] [0.010] [0.067] [0.015] [0.039] [0.019] [0.047] 
High/Middle school  X 
Educated 
-0.047** -0.026*** -0.171*** -0.026* -0.006 -0.02 -0.002 
[0.023] [0.009] [0.063] [0.014] [0.034] [0.017] [0.037] 
        Observations 60,634 86,528 5,005 86,678 11,663 61,812 4,090 
R-squared 0.108 0.074 0.144 0.057 0.176 0.102 0.159 
Number of countries 63 88 88 88 88 63 63 
Mean Dep. Variable 0.156 0.0603 0.468 0.136 0.611 0.0665 0.599 
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
       
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Complaints, education, and democracy 
 
This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions of the dependent variable from the WJP data set (shown in the first row) on indicator variables for the 
education status of the respondents and their interactions with an indicator variable coded 1 if the polity2 score from the 2011 Polity IV data set is below 0. All 
regressions include fixed effects for countries. Clustered standard errors are shown in brackets. 
 
Complained 
about 
government 
services 
Police abuse 
Report police 
abuse 
Burglary 
(WJP) 
Report 
burglary 
(WJP) 
Assault  Report Assault  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
       
College  0.054*** -0.008 0.078** 0.021*** 0.096*** 0.022** 0.077** 
[0.013] [0.005] [0.036] [0.007] [0.021] [0.010] [0.029] 
High/Middle school 0.030*** -0.008* 0.038 0.003 0.052*** 0.016** 0.003 
[0.011] [0.004] [0.033] [0.006] [0.017] [0.008] [0.025] 
College X Autocracy -0.007 0.003 0.035 0.02 0.043 0.003 0.033 
[0.023] [0.011] [0.057] [0.016] [0.040] [0.016] [0.040] 
High/Middle school  X 
Autocracy 
-0.009 0.006 -0.017 0.027** 0.014 0.004 0.023 
[0.021] [0.009] [0.059] [0.013] [0.026] [0.013] [0.029] 
        Observations 57,648 83,554 4,941 83,700 11,455 58,844 3,989 
R-squared 0.106 0.074 0.14 0.056 0.176 0.103 0.156 
Number of countries 60 85 85 85 85 60 60 
Mean Dep. Variable 0.161 0.062 0.472 0.138 0.609 0.068 0.597 
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
       
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Complaints and education controlling for the level of trust in public institutions, the income of the respondent, and 
gender 
 
This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions of the dependent variable from the WJP data set (shown in the first row) on indicator variables for the 
education status of the respondents, an index ranging between 0 and 1 measuring the trust in public institutions (with 1 indicating more trust), an indicator 
variable for whether the respondent is a male, and indicator variables for whether the income of the respondent is in the second, third, fourth, or highest quintile 
of the  country's income distribution (the omitted variable is the indicator for the lowest quintile). All regressions include fixed effects for countries. Clustered 
standard errors are shown in brackets. 
 
Complained 
about 
government 
services 
Police abuse 
Report police 
abuse 
Burglary 
(WJP) 
Report 
burglary 
(WJP) 
Assault  
Report 
Assault  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
       
College  0.053*** -0.010* 0.049 0.031*** 0.112*** 0.019** 0.053** 
[0.010] [0.006] [0.041] [0.009] [0.028] [0.008] [0.023] 
High/Middle school 0.029*** -0.010** 0.047 0.012* 0.075*** 0.012** -0.010 
[0.010] [0.005] [0.035] [0.007] [0.021] [0.006] [0.025] 
Trust Index -0.074*** -0.050*** 0.116** -0.041*** 0.012 -0.023* 0.047 
[0.026] [0.012] [0.048] [0.011] [0.032] [0.012] [0.053] 
Second income quintile -0.003 -0.004 0.031 -0.005 0.005 -0.004 0.047* 
[0.008] [0.005] [0.036] [0.005] [0.019] [0.004] [0.024] 
Third income quintile -0.01 -0.002 0.019 -0.003 0.022 0.003 0.065** 
[0.012] [0.005] [0.033] [0.006] [0.021] [0.005] [0.026] 
Fourth income quintile 0.005 -0.002 0.021 -0.004 0.016 0.004 0.063** 
[0.011] [0.007] [0.043] [0.007] [0.021] [0.006] [0.026] 
Highest income quintile 0.001 0.003 0.01 0.009 0.059** 0.001 -0.01 
[0.011] [0.006] [0.051] [0.010] [0.023] [0.005] [0.040] 
Male 0.021*** 0.022*** -0.029 0.008** -0.014 0.017*** -0.02 
 
[0.005] [0.003] [0.024] [0.004] [0.012] [0.003] [0.019] 
        Observations 52,272 53,053 2,911 53,111 7,335 53,117 3,540 
R-squared 0.115 0.082 0.170 0.064 0.168 0.105 0.165 
Number of countries 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 
Mean Dep. Variable 0.159 0.056 0.504 0.139 0.613 0.067 0.606 
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
       
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Crime victimization and reporting using the International Crime Victim Survey 
 
This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions of the dependent variable from the ICVS data set (shown in the first row) on indicator variables for the 
education status of the respondents. All regressions include fixed effects for countries. Clustered standard errors are shown in brackets.  
 
Burglary 
(ICVS) 
Report burglary 
(ICVS) 
Attempt 
Report 
Attempt 
Robbery 
Report 
Robbery 
Fraud 
Report 
Fraud 
Theft 
Report 
Theft 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  
   
   
   
College 0.021*** 0.105*** 0.034*** 0.044*** 0.023*** 0.091*** 0.104*** 0.012*** 0.084*** 0.036*** 
[0.003] [0.011] [0.003] [0.012] [0.002] [0.016] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.009] 
High/Middle school  0.011*** 0.056*** 0.028*** 0.024** 0.019*** 0.029** 0.052*** 0.014*** 0.044*** 0.014* 
[0.002] [0.010] [0.002] [0.010] [0.002] [0.013] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.007] 
  
   
   
   
Observations 126,318 15,289 125,596 13,382 126,367 8,546 115,860 24,906 126,162 24,475 
R-squared 0 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.008 0 0.005 0.001 
Mean Dep Var 0.128 0.571 0.114 0.305 0.0782 0.356 0.218 0.0505 0.206 0.276 
Number of countries 71 71 71 71 71 71 69 67 71 71 
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
                
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Corruption victimization and reporting using the International Crime Victim Survey 
 
This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions of the dependent variable from the ICVS data set (shown in the first row) on indicator variables for the 
education status of the respondents. All regressions include fixed effects for countries. Clustered standard errors are shown in brackets.  
 
 
Corruption 
(ICVS) 
Report 
corruption 
Police 
(ICVS) 
Report 
corruption 
other 
(ICVS) 
If not, why didn't you report it? 
 
A) not 
serious 
enough 
B) 
solved it 
myself 
C) 
inappropria
te for police 
D) other 
authorities 
E) my 
family 
solved it 
F) no 
insurance 
G) 
police 
could do 
nothing 
H) police 
won’t do 
anything 
I) 
fear/dislike 
of police 
J) did no 
dare 
K) other 
reasons 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
  
   
   
       
College 0.096*** 0.007 0.011** 0.038* -0.025 -0.030** -0.005 -0.004 0.025 -0.004 -0.014* -0.023** 0.01 0.037*** 
[0.005] [0.007] [0.005] [0.022] [0.019] [0.015] [0.019] [0.010] [0.017] [0.014] [0.007] [0.011] [0.013] [0.012] 
High/Middle 
school  
0.058*** -0.002 0.002 0.028 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.008 0.013 0.011 -0.006 -0.003 -0.006 0.012 
[0.004] [0.006] [0.005] [0.019] [0.016] [0.013] [0.016] [0.008] [0.015] [0.012] [0.006] [0.009] [0.011] [0.010] 
 
 
   
   
       
Observations 46,022 5,324 4,432 5,239 5,231 5,082 5,221 5,082 5,082 5,082 5,233 5,221 5,082 5,260 
R-squared 0.01 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0.001 0 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
Mean D.V. 0.118 0.0195 0.0111 0.344 0.215 0.112 0.208 0.046 0.16 0.0927 0.0294 0.0575 0.0803 0.0741 
Countries 23 23 22 23 23 22 23 22 22 22 23 23 22 23 
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
 
   
   
       
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8 (Cont.): Corruption victimization and reporting using the International Crime Victim Survey 
 
This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions of the dependent variable from the ICVS data set (shown in the first row) on indicator variables for the 
education status of the respondents. All regressions include fixed effects for countries. Clustered standard errors are shown in brackets.  
 
If yes, why did you report it? 
 
A) recover 
property 
B) 
insurance 
reasons 
C) should be 
reported 
D) want 
offender 
caught 
E) to stop 
it 
F) to get 
help 
G) 
compensation 
H) other 
reasons 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
 
   
    
College -0.277* -0.097 -0.044 0.207 -0.038 0.045 -0.045 0.152* 
[0.159] [0.170] [0.147] [0.184] [0.142] [0.103] [0.061] [0.079] 
High/Middle 
school  
-0.094 -0.06 -0.014 0.14 0.022 0.092 -0.025 0.057 
[0.132] [0.135] [0.122] [0.154] [0.119] [0.086] [0.051] [0.064] 
 
 
   
    
Observations 105 86 110 107 108 106 105 82 
R-squared 0.044 0.005 0.001 0.016 0.005 0.017 0.007 0.058 
Mean D.V. 0.343 0.291 0.236 0.364 0.222 0.0755 0.0286 0.0366 
Countries 23 22 23 23 23 23 23 14 
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
 
   
    
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: Corruption victimization and reporting using the TI Global Corruption Barometer 
 
This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions of the dependent variable from the TI Global Corruption Barometer 2009 data set (shown in the first row) 
on indicator variables for the education status of the respondents. All regressions include fixed effects for countries. Clustered standard errors are shown in 
brackets.   
 Corruption 
(Barometer) 
Report 
Corruption 
(Barometer) 
Why you did not present the complaint? 
 
A) Did not 
know how to 
do it 
B) It would 
have taken too 
much time 
C) It would 
not have 
helped at all 
D) Tried 
but 
couldn’t 
E) Fear of 
reprisals 
F) Other 
reasons 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
      
 
  
College 0.043*** 0.024** -0.061*** 0.006 0.072*** -0.001 -0.032** -0.002 
[0.004] [0.011] [0.012] [0.013] [0.016] [0.008] [0.013] [0.008] 
High/Middle 
school  
0.022*** 0.013 -0.015 0.005 0.049*** -0.005 -0.030*** 0.003 
[0.004] [0.010] [0.011] [0.012] [0.014] [0.007] [0.012] [0.008] 
      
 
  Observations 60,184 10,179 8,160 8,160 8,160 8,160 8,160 8,160 
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mean Dep Var 0.177 0.198 0.163 0.24 0.494 0.0558 0.218 0.075 
Number of 
countries 
62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
                 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0 
